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Norwegian secret internet censorship blacklist, 3518 domains, 18 Mar 2009

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March 18, 2009
Summary

Full list of 3518 secretly blacklisted sites as of 18th of March 2009. Similar to the Danish list, with which it shares 1097 domains.

The filter list feeds into the so-called CSAADF (Child Sexual Abuse Anti Distribution Filter), which has been marketed as a method of combating child pornography. The filter is an unlegislated cooperation between Telenor (Norway's leading internet service provider or ISP) and Kripos (the Norwegian police for organized crime, economical crime and other serious criminal issues).

Several other ISPs in Norway have begun to use the system.

The blacklist is maintained and distributed by Kripos. The ISP implements this blacklist in its Domain Name System (DNS) servers. The source states that user lookup of these blacklisted sites are recorded by the DNS server and made available to Kripos by the ISP.

This list is for "whole of site" censoring. It doesn't address more granular individual page censoring techniques, which may also be being used.

The filter system can be used to censor any site.

The list is generated without judicial or public oversight and is kept secret by the ISPs using it. Unaccountability is intrinsic to such a secret censorship system.

Many of the sites on the list have no obvious connection to child pornography. Some have clearly changed owners while others were possibly even wrongly placed on the list in the first instance.

The list has been leaked because cases such as Thailand (a mandatory scheme) demonstrate that once a secret censorship system is established for pornographic content the same system can rapidly expand to cover other material, including political material, at the worst possible moment -- when government needs reform.

In December Wikileaks released the secret Internet censorship list for Thailand. Of the sites censored in 2008, at least 1,203, had the internally noted reason of "lese majeste" -- failing to self-censor criticism of the Royal family. Like Denmark, the Thai censorship system was originally promoted as a mechanism to prevent the flow of child pornography.

In January 2009, the Thai system was used to censor Western reportage of the imprisonment of Harry Nicolaides, an Greek-Australian writer who was detained for writing a novel which contained a single paragraph deemed to be critical of an unnamed Crown Prince and so violate "lese majeste".  sweetnote  The partly legislated Australian system, which has fines of upto $11,000 a day for those who link to pages on its secret blacklist has been used to censor links to pages on Wikileaks and a pro-life site. An attempt is being made to introduce a mandatory national automatic censorship regime. The existing system and the proposal face strong political opposition in Australia.

The unlegislated Finnish system has been used to silence the site of a Finnish censorship critic and the page on Wikileaks about the Finnish system.

Customers accessing the internet via mobile phones associated with the ISPs are also affected by this blacklist.

Research shows that while such blacklists are dangerous to "above ground" activities such as political discourse, they have little effect on the production of child pornography, and by diverting resources and attention from traditional policing actions, may be counter-productive. For a fascinating insider's account, see My life in child porn.

A hyperlinked version of the list follows.
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Context
Norway
Government (bureaucracy)
Kripos (Norway)
Primary language
English
File size in bytes
60827
File type information
ASCII text
Cryptographic identity
SHA256 349be77a94e65db0ce1b134614afe500a8455e96cc4b2eba115ed1893625dcde



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