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The looting of Kenya under President Moi

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President Daniel arap Moi, seen here walking through a guard of honnor

The breathtaking extent of corruption perpetrated by the family of the former Kenyan leader Daniel Arap Moi is revealed in a secret report which lays bare a web of shell companies, secret trusts and frontmen used to steal over two billion dollars worth of state money.

The suppressed U.K auditor's report details how Kenyan state finances were laundered across the world to buy properties and companies in London, New York and South Africa and even a 10,000 hectare ranch in Australia.

The countries involved in the corrupt dealings include Australia, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Finland, Germany, Grand Cayman, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Liechtenstein, Liberia, Luxembourg, Malawi, Namibia, the Netherlands, Puerto Rico, Russia, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Switzerland, the UAE, Uganda, the United Kingdom, the United States and Zaire.

The intricately detailed report, commissioned by President Kibaki after his 2002 election victory but later suppressed, forensically investigates corrupt transactions and holdings by several powerful members of the Kenyan elite.

The sums are comparable in magnitude to the looting of infamous kleptocrats such as Mobutu (Zaire), Marcos (Philippines), Abacha (Nigeria), Suharto (Indonesia) and Fujimori (Peru). The leaked material is extremely politically sensitive. Ex-President Moi has become a key player in political life in Kenya, and is now an essential pillar in President Kibaki's campaign for re-election in December 2007.

Leak
KTM report - on-line edition, unproofed
KTM report.pdf (file info page) - authoritative original, 4Mb of scanned printed pages
Verification status
Verified
Media contacts
See Media Kit
Additional media contacts
Transparency International, Mars Group Kenya and http://www.kroll.com/ (Kroll won't comment on the record)
Date
August 30, 2007 (last updated September 9, 2007)
By
Wikileaks' staff


Contents

Introduction

In December 2002, the 24 year rule of Kenya's President Daniel Arap Moi was ended by the election victory of Mwai Kibaki. Elected on an anti-corruption platform, it was hoped that President Kibaki would end grand corruption in Kenya. In January 2003 Kibaki appointed John Githongo, formerly of Transparency International, as his personal advisor on Anti Corruption and Good Governance.[1] One of the first anti-corruption activities of Mr. Githongo on behalf of President Kibaki was to engage Kroll & Associates (UK), a private investigation and security firm, to trace and report on what was said by Transparency International to be over 3 billion US Dollars stashed abroad, by the former President Moi and his closest associates.[2]

Mwai Kibaki being sworn in as President of Kenya after his election on an anti-corruption ticket in December 2002; "Corruption will now cease to be a way of life in Kenya. I am calling upon all of you Kenyans to help the government fight corruption, as our first priority". The bible's price tag is visible.[3].

Close to half of Kenya's 35 million citizens live under the UN's poverty level of 1 US dollar a day. If the restitution programme started in 2003 had been completed it would have been possible to get justice for the tens of millions of Kenyans who live in abject poverty - as the political elite live as Dollar Millionaires on the proceeds of corruption.

The leaked document, dated April 2004, is clearly self explanatory - being one of the preliminary reports received by the Government of Kenya (described in the report as the "client"). The persons stated as "Targets" are President Moi's closest associates and relatives.

Contemporaneous media coverage of the time reveals a determination by the Kibaki government to trace and seize the foreign assets of Moi's associates.[4] However at some point in May 2004, the Kibaki government itself suffered a credibility blow when several of the President's closest advisors were implicated in a 777 million US Dollar corruption scandal known as the Anglo Leasing scandal. The fallout of this scandal resulted in the gradual sidelining and eventual exile in the UK (in January 2005) of John Githongo after threats to his life.[5] The anti-corruption czar had lost the support of the Kenyan President. It was at this point that the Government dropped its international asset tracing and recovery efforts. It is believed it was at this point that the Kroll Report on Moi and his associates was suppressed.

On August 28th 2007, about 100 days before the forthcoming Presidential election, President Kibaki's re-election campaign received the formal endorsement of his predecessor, Daniel Moi.[6] Ex-President Moi's influence over Kibaki's regime is obvious and also evidenced by his recent appointment as a Personal Peace Envoy of Kibaki to the Sudan.[7]

None of the assets traced and identified by Kroll have been impounded and Moi and his associates are experiencing a resurgence in political clout. Among these assets are a bank in Belgium, hotels and residences in the USA, UK, South Africa, Namibia and as far away as Australia, a 10% shareholding in Kenya's most successful telecommunications company (a joint venture with Vodafone PLC of the UK) and massive real estate and agricultural investments.

The leak which emanated from within high levels of the Kenyan Government is motivated by the desire to demonstrate that President Kibaki has clear-cut evidence of his predecessor's corruption and complicity in corruption, and has chosen to suppress the evidence and worse still has gone into a political and economic alliance with the Moi group.

A second motivation is the sheer scale of the theft of public funds by Moi and his associates. The figures in the report run into (if added up) the billions of US Dollars - comparable in magnitude to the looting of other infamous kleptocrats such as Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire, Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines, Sani Abacha of Nigeria, Suharto of Indonesia and Alberto Fujimori of Peru.

The leaked material is extremely politically sensitive. Ex-President Moi, a corrupt, brutal, discredited former dictator, has somehow again become a key player in political life in Kenya - so much, that he is now an essential pillar in current President Kibaki's re-election campaign. His massive financial resources are expected to be used to buy Kibaki popular support particularly in the populous Rift Valley region, which voted almost to the man against Kibaki in the last election, and in November 2005 during a constitutional referendum. The leaker thinks the re-emergence of President Moi is scandalous and must be stopped.

The leak will certainly interest the Kenyan media, for whom this report represents a grail of sorts. Kenya's large international press corps will also be an interested audience. With a Presidential election only a few months away, the report comes to light at a critical time.


About the report

The leaked report is 106 pages long and contains several sections: executive summary (1-10), source enquiries (11-54), business associates and front men (55-76), and appendix (77-106).[8] The executive summary outlines the most suspicious financial transactions, properties and business links discovered in its investigation. A series of additional enquiries is proposed. The following sections proceed in intricate detail, investigating the background, 'modus operandi', business links, financial transactions, business associates, and property holdings, all around the world, of several powerful members of Kenyan society linked to Daniel arap Moi.

The report is highly verifiable. Kroll UK, Transparency International, John Githongo, and http://www.marskenya.org, a Kenyan website that documents grand corruption incidents, are suggested for full or partial corroboration and the document appears consistent with the public record.


The leaked report's author: Kroll Associates UK Limited

Kroll Associates UK Limited is a limited liability company incorporated in England (registered number 2020412) whose registered office is at 10 Fleet Place, London, United Kingdom EC4M 7RB. Its father company Kroll Inc., headquartered in New York, US is a private investigation and security consulting firm founded by Jules B. Kroll in 1972. It provides corporate risk consulting services including financial advisory and investigations, identity fraud solutions, background screening, forensic accounting, bodyguard services, corporate restructuring, and security technology services. The company is now a subsidiary of Marsh & McLennan Companies who aquired it in July 2004.

The US government and the weapons industry is a major permanent contractor of Kroll Inc.[9].

Kroll Inc. was also responsible for security of the World Trade Center site until it was destroyed in the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

In October 2004, the Brazil offices of Kroll Inc. were raided by the police because of alleged spying activities on the government. The company was originally reported to have been hired by the Brazilian investment firm Opportunity to investigate Telecom Italia, with whom it has been battling to gain control of Brazil Telecom, one of Brazil's largest telephone companies. Other notable cases include the corporate restructuring of Enron after its 2001 accounting scandal, the law enforcement monitoring of Los Angeles Police Department in a US federal consent decree mandating major reforms designed to end corruption and abuse.

Kroll UK has also investigated other Kenyan corruption scandals, such as the so-called Anglo-Leasing Scandal.[10]

Andrew Marshal

Andrew R. Marshall is chief risk officer for Business Intelligence and Investigations. He joined Kroll in 2003 and has also been head of the Emerging Markets practice in Europe, Middle East and Africa.

Mr. Marshall spent 15 years in international journalism. He was foreign editor, Washington Bureau chief and Brussels Bureau chief for The Independent newspaper between 1990 and 2000. He also worked on the foreign staff of the Financial Times and for Oxford Analytica.

He is the author, with Mathew Horsman, of After the Nation-State (HarperCollins, 1994) and has contributed to other books. He has widespread broadcasting and radio experience. [11]

His contact details are: +44 207 029 5162, amarshall@kroll.com

Secondary media based on the leak and this analysis


Mars Group Kenya, a Kenyan anti-corruption site, maintains a comprehensive page about the scandal.

The following lists are in reverse-chronological order (approximate):

Video

Print

(Use username cypherpunks password cypherpunks for nationmedia.com)

See also

Joshua Kulei

Joshua Kulei, Former "personal assistant" to President Daniel arap Moi, on whom travel restrictions were imposed as a result of a previous corruption scandal, the Goldenberg affair.[12]

Joshua Kulei has represented ex-president Daniel Arap Moi in over 50 companies operating in Kenya across all sectors of the economy. (page 18)

He also used banks in Luxembourg for ex-president Moi's confidential banking (page 33)

According to the report, Kulei has now relinquished all of his assets held under his name on behalf of the Moi family with the exception of ex-president Moi's flower business, The Trans-National Bank and NAS. (page 18)

Ownership of businesses

  1. Trade World Kenya - 100% (page 19)
  2. CFC Bank 12.5% (page 19)
  3. CMC Holdings 15-20% (Client material Indicates Kulei also Nominee Director) (page 19)
  4. Hotel intercontinental Nairobi 19% (page 19)
  5. Sian Roses 40% (page 19)
  6. Ngata Flower Farm 50% (page 19)
  7. Bamburi Cement 14% (Client material Indicates Kulei also Nominee Director) (page 19)
  8. KTN (page 19)
  9. National Milling Company (page 19)
  10. Kenya Aerotech Ltd‚ Shareholder and also Nominee Director (page 19)
  11. Regent Management‚ Not Known (page 19)
  12. Siginon Freight‚ 12.5%, Kabarak High School and client material Indicates Kulei also Nominee Director (page 19)

Sits on the Board of Governors for the following schools and universities

  1. Sacho High School (page 21)
  2. Moi High School Kabarak (page 21)
  3. Sunshine Secondary School (page 21)
  4. Moi Educational Centre (page 21)
  5. Kabarak University Council (page 21)

Trustee of

  1. Sunshine Educational Trust (page 21)

Management Board member in

  1. The Moi Africa Institute Kabarnet Gardens, Nairobi (page 21)

Properties

In the UK

  1. 19 Eaton Park, Cobham, Surrey KT11 2JF valued at around 4.5 million sterling pounds (page 22)
  2. Flat 11 No. 49, Lowdnes Square, London, valued at 2 million sterling pounds (page 22)

In Kenya:

  1. Courtyard Property Investment Ltd (page 22-23)
  2. Regent Management‚ real estate holdings believed to be about 200 houses in all (page 23)
  3. Lavington House (page 23)
  4. Karen Residence (page 23)
  5. Nakuru Residence (page 23)
  6. C. Owns several unidentified properties in the United States of America (page 23)
  7. D. Has property interests in South Africa (page 23)

Bank Balances (page 26)

Business Associates

  1. Terrer Kulei (page 26-27)
  2. Pankaj Somaia (page 27)
  3. Ketan Somaia (page 27)
  4. Josiah Kiplagat (page 27-28)
  5. Alnoor Kassam (page 28)
  6. Mr. Tum (page 28)

Gideon Moi

Gideon Moi, son of ex-President Daniel arap Moi and a current (2007) member of the Kenyan parliament.[13]

Ownership of businesses

Client Material indicates ownership of the following:

  1. Giro Bank – Held under Asian nominee businessmen
  2. Taurino Enterprises
  3. As alleged by Msamaha
  4. KTN (Owned Standard Newspapers) - (page 19)
  5. Siginon Freight – 12.5% - (page 19)
  6. Trans-National Bank - (page 19)
  7. Kent ship Maritime (page 30)
  8. Sielei Properties Ltd (page 30)
  9. Giant Holdings Ltd (page 30)
  10. Revak Ltd (page 30)
  11. Sudbury Ltd (page 30)
  12. Sudbury Investments (page 30)
  13. Giant Forex Bureau (page 30)
  14. Westfield International Ltd (page 30)
  15. Chesco Ltd (page 30)
  16. Hampstead Enterprises (page 30)
  17. Metipso Services Ltd (page 30).
  18. Maternity Shop (page 30)
  19. Eagle Airlines (page 30)
  20. Chemusian Company (page 30)
  21. Fresh Produce Ltd (page 30)
  22. Siginon Freight – 12.5% (page 30)
  23. Cartrack Kenya Ltd (page 30)
  24. First American Bank (page 30)
  25. Equatorial Bank (page 30)
  26. The Sasine Group of farms (page 30)
  27. Cable Wireless (page 30)
  28. The Duty Free Company (page 31)
  29. Eveready Company (H. Young) (page 31)
  30. Tobacco Farm in Malawi – 100% (page 31)
  31. Chester House ‚Äì 50 % (page 31)
  32. Safaricom Kenya (together with Biwott, Charles Field Marsham) – 40% (page 31)

Source Enquiries indicate that Gideon owns the following:

  1. Property ownership—Owned in Italy and Sultanate of Brunei (page 55)
  2. Cut Tobacco Ltd (page 56)
  3. Bank Accounts—Sultanate of Brunei (page 56)
  4. Sandhurst Matrix Inc (page 56)
  5. Saphire—Managed by Mr. Sevak (page 56)
  6. Garlan Investments—Director — Dr. Clemente (page 56)

Preliminary results of global searches conducted under Garian investments and Sandhurst Matrix Inc have not revealed any findings. Further searches are required. (page 56)

Properties

In the UK

  1. Allegedly has two properties in London held under a trust set up by Mukesh Gohil (page 31)
  2. In South Africa: Owns a number of properties in South Africa. His frontman is Harbinder Singh Sethi, has 74 properties listed under closed corporations all of which are registered in his name. (page 32)

Finance

  1. United Kingdom: By the year 2002, Gideon’s cash in various banks overseas amounted to 550 million sterling pounds (page 32)
  2. Grand Cayman (page 32)
  3. Luxembourg (page 32-33)
  4. Dubai: Allen & Overy holds all of Gideon’s accounts (page 33)
  5. South Africa: Has accounts in South Africa and possibly Malawi. Gideon’s frontman is Harbinder Singh Sethi (page 33)

Kenya

  1. Eurobank: Currently under liquidation (page 34)
  2. Giro Bank: Allegedly owns Giro Bank under a front of Asian nominees (page 34)
  3. Trust Bank: Under Liquidation (page 35)
  4. Citibank – prime exit point for Gideon’s cash to his off-shore accounts (page 35)
  5. ABN AMRO - to move illegally obtained cash emanating from corrupt deals to safe havens in off-shore accounts (page 35)
  6. First American Bank: Client material suggests Naushad Merali and ex-president Moi control First American Bank (page 35)
  7. SAMUT Trust: All of Gideon’s monies invested in Kenya are held by a trust called SAMUT (page 35-36)

Business Associates

  1. Mukesh Gohil (page 37)
  2. Harbinder Singh Sethi (page 37)
  3. Joshua Orwa Ojode (page 37)
  4. Jared Kamgwana (page 37)
  5. Dr. Kiplagat (page 37-38)
  6. Donald Kipkorir (page 38)

Nicholas Biwott

Nichalos Biwott, a wealthy Kenyan businessman and politician, previously linked to a number of crimes and corruption scandals though never convicted.[14]

Ownership of Businesses

  1. Kobil Petrol – 100% (page 39)
  2. Barsirim Investment – 100% (page 39)
  3. Kiosinende Farm – 100% (page 39)
  4. Rono Ltd. – 100% (page 40)
  5. HZ Consrtruction and Engineering – 100% (page 40)
  6. HZ Group of Companies – 100% (page 40)
  7. LZ Engineering – 100% (page 40)
  8. Yaya centre (worth Kshs. 3.5 billion) – 100% (page 40)
  9. Premier Group of Companies – 100% (page 40)
  10. Air Kenya Aviation – 100% (page 40)
  11. Pete Aviation and Electronics Ltd – 100% (page 40)
  12. Ziba Management and Services – 100% (page 40)
  13. HZ Group of Companies, Israel – 100% (page 40)
  14. Lima Kenya – 50% (page 40)
  15. Air Kenya – 50% (page 40)
  16. National Milling Corporation – shareholder (page 40)
  17. Safaricom Kenya (together with Gideon Moi, Charles Field Marsham) – 40% (page 40)
  18. Team Simoco (He is majority shareholder) (page 102)

Open research indicates ownership of:

  1. Kenol-Kobil – Biwott controlled 17% of the private oil industry in Kenya (page 40)
  2. Petrol Stations in Uganda operated through Kenol-Kobil and worth Kshs. 7 billion (page 40)
  3. Wesmont – Independent power producer company owned by Biwott and Harbinder Sethi Singh (page 40)
  4. Grand Diani Reef Hotel (page 40-41)
  5. Regional Air (page 41)
  6. H. Young and Company (page 41)
  7. S. R Telecommunications Co. Ltd (page 41)
  8. First American Bank (page 41)
  9. Pan African Bank (no longer in operation) (page 41)
  10. Middle East Bank (page 41)
  11. Trans-National Bank (page 41)
  12. Government of Kenya (page 41)

Open research indicates law firms representing his interests are:

  1. Shapely & Berret Advocates (page 41)
  2. Esmail & Esmail (page 41)
  3. Kapila & Kapila (page 41)
  4. De Gama Rose Advocates (page 41)
  5. Law firm established by daughter Rita Biwott (page 41)

Properties

  1. Kenya: bought a house in Riverside Drive from the Irish embassy that was paid for offshore on an undisclosed date (page 42)

Finance

Kenya

  1. Middle East Bank: Biwott purchased Middle East Bank using Akber Esmail as a nominee (pg42)
  2. Trade Bank: Biwott transferred his operations to Trade Bank, then owned by Alnoor Kassam. It’s also alleged that Trade bank was involved in export financing fraud to a #quantum of about Kshs. 700 million, that Trade Bank took over Yaya center from Kassam and that Solomon Muthamia, a forex dealer with the bank was entrusted with laundering the proceeds of Turkwell Gorge on behalf of Biwott and Moi. (page 42-45)
  3. Pan African Bank: Kobil banked with Pan African Bank

Switzerland

  1. Credit Suisse and Citibank (page 46)
  2. Bank Cantonale Vaudoise: Significant amounts of money being moved from Bank Cantonale Vaudoise on behalf of Biwott (page 46-47)

Belgium

  1. Banque Belgolaise: Reported that Biwott and ex-president Moi are joint owners of Banque Belgolaise, 40% of which is owned by Biwott (page 47)

Business Associates

  1. Gad Zeevi (page 47-48)
  2. Akber Esmail (page 48-49)
  3. Naushad Merali (page 49-50)
  4. Horatius de Gama Rose (page 50)
  5. Mohammed Bawazir (page 50)
  6. Mohammed Aslam (page 51)
  7. Alnoor Kassam (page 51 -53)
  8. Charles Field-Marsham (page 53)
  9. Joseph Schwartzman (page 53-54)
  10. Ben Sassoon (page 54)
  11. Danny Vardi (page 54)
  12. David Bartknowski (page 54)
  13. Biwott was involved in the siphoning of funds from th proceeds of Turkwell Gorge Hydro- Electric Dam Project (page 108)


Philip Moi

Philip Moi, son of ex-President Daniel arap Moi.

It is understood that Philip has an estimated wealth of approximately $ 770 million and controls more hidden cash than Gideon, even though significant attention has been directed at the latter. (page 55).

Business links

  1. Gateway Properties Inc—1992 documentary evidence (page 55)
  2. Paradise Holdings (page 55)
  3. Sheraton Holdings (page 55)
  4. Hahuru Investors (page 55)
  5. General Commodity Dealers (page 55)
  6. Kiharu Investors (page 55)
  7. Concord Holdings—Connected to Goldenberg (page 55)
  8. Panafcon Engineering (page 55)
  9. Tiger Farm Limited (page 55)
  10. Ecta Kenya Limited (page 55)

Finance

He operates accounts in London’s Branch of HSBC and Standard Chartered Plc.

Barclays Bank (page 57)

The details of the account Philip Moi holds at Barclays bank are as follows:

Name of Bank: Barclays Bank Plc.
Address: Barclays Business Centre Hampstead High Street Branch, 28 Hampstead,London NW3 1 QB
Sort Code: 203616
Account Number: 90391158

As this information dates back ten years ago, it is possibly connected to Goldenberg

Credit Suisse Zurich, Switzerland. (page 57)

Rosanna Moi indicated that in October 2002, Philip Moi lost US Dollrs 15 million to an Italian family on a deal that failed to deliver. This money was paid to his family through Philip’s Sandhurst Matrix Inc account held at Credit Suisse, Zurich

Sultanate of Brunei (page 57)

Philip is a close friend of Prince Hamid of Brunei. Moi’s family has invested heavily through Prince Hamid.The precise details of Philip’s investments through these investments are not known. Philip’s wife was planning to spend a vacation of Christmas 2003 in Brunei with their children.

Business Associates

  1. Zara/Rosanna Moi (page 57)
  2. Dr. Clemente (page 58)
  3. Akasha Family (page 59)
  4. Muzahim (page 59)


KTM report country index

What follows is a list of countries (excluding Kenya) involved in the holdings, transactions and other links of Moi's associates, as detailed in the original leaked report, KTM_report.pdf.

Australia

  • Target 3's wife lived in Australia (page 15)
  • Biwott's investment with commercial interests in Australia (page 39)
  • Biwott / Ownership of a 10.000 hectare ranch (page 40)
  • Mukesh Gohil / Directorship of two companies (page 65)
  • Mukesh Gohil / Shantilal Brother (Australia) Pty Ltd (page 85)
  • Mukesh Gohil / South Austral Pty Ltd (page 86)

Belgium

  • Biwott / Moi (joint?) ownership of Banque Belolaise (page 47)
  • Team Simoco / Simens International / Siemens Atea, the Belgian branch (page 104)

Brunei

  • Philip is a close friend of Prince Hamid of Brunei (page 57)
  • Moi's family has invested heavily through Prince Hamid (page 57)
  • Philip's wife and children were planning to spend Christmas 2003 vacation in Brunei (page 57)

Canada

  • Charles Field-Marshal / Biwott's son in law, manager Yaya Center / canadian citizenship and present residence (page 53)

Dubai

  • Saimon Roadrekearek of Allen & Overy (page 33)
  • Gideon telephone call to Mukesh (page 36)

Finland

  • Public sector related fraud / Generators from Finland (page 110)

Germany

  • $200 million laundered via Frankfurt (page 8)
  • Solomon Muthamia / Biwott's funds channelled to bank accounts in Germany (page 45)
  • PAB / Aslam / Biwott's money recycles through unidentified German bank (page 46)
  • Team Simoco / Siemens International / Siemens Group (page 104)
  • Proceeds of Turkwell Gorge Hydro-Electric Dam Project / Unidentified banks (page 108)

Grand Cayman

  • Gideon / Ken Boit (page 32)

Israel

  • Biwott's investment with commercial interests (page 39)
  • Zeevi's present residence / under investigation (page 48)
  • Danny Vardi / Israeli national, former Israeli Defence Force, an advidor to the Israeli government of natural gaz projects (page 54)
  • David Bartknowski / Israeli national, Gad Zeevi's former CFO (page 54)

Italy

  • Philip Moi / property ownership (page 55)
  • Zara/Rosanna Moi / Philip's Italian wife / numerous bank operations (page 57)
  • Zara/Rosanna Moi travelled from Italy to Leichtenstein and Switzerland (page 57)
  • Zara/Rosanna Moi is relatively unknown, so Philip prefers to use her as his 'Italian connection' (page 58)
  • Philip refuses to visit Italy, uses Dr. Cliemente to recover money (page 58)
  • Mrs Moi was visiting Italy to meet Dr. Cliemente to discuss money (page 58)
  • Philip provided cover to Italian families dealing with drugs in Malindi (page 59)

Japan

  • Naushad Merali / contract secured to supply Daihatsu 4x4s to government parastatals (page 49)

Jersey

  • Millions held (page 8)

Leichtenstein

  • Zara/Rosanna Moi made visits to Leichtenstein (page 57)

Liberia

  • Muzahim / Philip / counterfeiting (page 59)

Luxembourg

  • Kulei / Moi / Gideon / CitiCorp / CitiBank / UBP (page 33)

Malawi

  • Tobacco farm owned by Gideon (page 31)
  • Gideon's meeting with Habinder Singh Sethi (page 37)

Namibia

  • President Sam Nujoma (page 13)
  • Meeting with President Nujoma (page 29)

Netherlands

  • Team Simoco / Background / Philips Electronics N.V. (page 102)

Puerto Rico

  • Moi / Biwott / Zeevi's investment in oil refineries (page 48)

Russia

  • Zeevi / Chernoy corrupt dealings

Somalia

  • Muzahim / Philip / counterfeiting (page 59)

South Africa

  • 74 closed corporations under the name of Harbinder Singh Sethi (page 10)
  • Gideon (page 13)
  • Kulei has property interests (page 23)
  • 74 closed corporations under the name of Harbinder Singh Sethi (page 32)
  • Gideon / Harbinder Singh Sethi (page 33)
  • Sethi holds many of Gideon's assets, a ranch (page 37)
  • Sethi flew the Moi's carrying cases of dollars (page 37)
  • Gideon / Kiplagat / sale of $650,000 Durban-based residential property (page 38)
  • Harbinder Singh Sethi / resident in Sandton, Johannesburg (page 65)
  • Harbinder Singh Sethi / property (pages 66-67)
  • Sethi / 'member' of 74 closed corporations (pages 68-71)

Sudan

  • Muzahim / Philip / counterfeiting (page 59)

Switzerland

  • $200 million laundered via UBP. (page 8)
  • Geneva launder Gabriel Moussa Katri (page 8)
  • $100-$500 million laundered via UBP (page 8)
  • Transfer orchestrated by Mukesh Gohil (page 8)
  • Credit Swiss / Sandhurt Matrix / Dr Clemente / Garian Investments (page 9)
  • Gabriel Moussa Katri's $200 million launder / UBP (page 24, 25)
  • PAB / Aslam / Biwott's money recycles through unidentified Swiss bank (page 46)
  • Zeevi and Biwott's accounts Credit Suisse in Geneva and Citiban in Zurich (page 46)
  • Zeevi / $12 million credit from Credit Suisse (page 46)
  • Biwott / significant amount of money moved from Banque Cantonale Vaudoise (page 46)
  • Philip Moi / lost US$15 million process paid through account held at Credit Suisse, Zurich (page 57)
  • Zara/Rosanna Moi visited Lugano in Ticino, a remote area but with over 100 banks (page 57)
  • 'Not surprising' that Zara should visit Lugano, since major international drug barons favor this destination (page 58)
  • Gabriel Moussa Katri / Banque Patrimoines Prives Geneve BPG SA (pages 89-90)
  • Gabriel Moussa Katri / Discount Bank and Trust Company "The Recanati Bank" (pages 90-91)
  • Gabriel Moussa Katri / Union Bancaire Privee (pages 91-92)
  • Gabriel Moussa Katri / Banque Privee de Rothschild S.A. (pages 92-93)

Uganda

  • Ownership of petrol stations operated through Kenol-Kobil (page 40)
  • Biwott expelled in 1972 (page 48)
  • Damani Harshad / Article in 'The Monitor' / Ugandan individual (page 79)

United Kingdom

  • Mukesh Gohil / Citibank (page 9)
  • HSBC / Standard Chartered PLC / Barclays (page 10, 56)
  • 6.5 million pounds laundered into Surrey and Knightsbridge (page 10)
  • Sovereign Group Ltd / Sovereign holdings (page 11)
  • Hotels in London (page 13)
  • Kulei and Moi properties in Surrey (page 22)
  • Broadlands Overseas S.A (page 22)
  • Lowdnes Square London (page 22)
  • Kulei stock brokers (page 27)
  • Gideon / Mukesh Gohil properties in London (page 31)
  • 550 million pounds laundered via Citibank (page 32)
  • Mukesh / Gideon holdings in London (page 32)
  • Chales Field-Marsham / code-sharing arrangement with British Airways (page 41)
  • Rayner / resident in the UK (page 44)
  • Solomon Muthamia / Biwott's funds channelled to bank accounts in UK (page 45)
  • Field Marsham / work in an international investment bank in London (page 53)
  • Philip Moi / issue cheques for the purchase of equipment for manufacturing cooking fat (page 56)
  • Philip Moi / used HSBC account to buy equipment for Cut Tobacco Ltd. (page 56)
  • Philip Moi / signed ‚ǧ500000 Barclays Bank cheques for and behalf of Gateway Properties Inc (page 56)
  • Mukesh Gohil / Properties in Middlesex, Bedfordshire and Leicestershire (pages 61-64)
  • Mukesh Gohil / Directorship of 3 companies (pages 64-65)
  • Sethi / former directorships of 3 companies (page 67)
  • Naushad Noorali Merali / Directorships in 2 companies (page 73)
  • Merali / Holdings in several companies (pages 73-74)
  • Rohit Pattni / Two properties in Middlesex and Surrey (pages 75-76)
  • Rohit Pattni / Director of 6 companies (pages 76-78)
  • Vaju Pattni / KP's brother is in London, travels to Birmingham, Manchester (page 79)
  • Vaju Pattni / Property in Sudbury US$1m (page 79)
  • Damani Harshad / Located in Hertfordshire (page 79)
  • Damani Harshad / Director of company (page 80)
  • Hema Damani / Director of company (page 80)
  • Vaju Pattni / Property searches (pages 80-81)
  • Mukesh Gohil / Armada Services Ltd (page 84)
  • Mukesh Gohil / Technology 4 All Ltd (page 84)
  • Mukesh Gohil / Aandatta Ltd (page 85)
  • Harbinder Sethi / BasicStone Ltd (pages 86-87)
  • Harbinder Sethi / Canray Ltd (pages 87-88)
  • Harbinder Sethi / Hollywood Electronics Ltd (pages 88-89)
  • Naushad Merali / W.P.H Kenya Tea Ltd (page 94)
  • Naushad Merali / Overseas International Telecommunications Ltd (pages 94-95)
  • Akber Esmail / Steel Brothers and Company (pages 95-97)
  • Horatius da Gama Rose / Symphony Global Technologies Plc (page 97)
  • Rohit Pattni / Octogen Ltd (pages 97-98)
  • Rohit Pattni / Riverton Securities Ltd (page 98)
  • Rohit Pattni / Deonberry Finance Ltd (pages 98-99)
  • Rohit Pattni / Ashym Properties Ltd (pages 99-100)
  • Rohit Pattni / L Thomas & Company Ltd (page 100)
  • Rohit Pattni / Fairoak Investments Ltd (pages 100-101)
  • Team Simoco / Corporate records listing (pages 103-104)
  • Team Simoco / Team Communications / Company listings (page 104)
  • Proceeds of Turkwell Gorge Hydro-Electric Dam Project / Unidentified banks (page 108)

United States

  • Properties held (page 11)
  • Kulei / Terer Kulei owns several properties in NY (page 23, 26)
  • Alnoor Kassam / Zeevi agreement of sale of Trade Bank in NY (page 51)
  • Field Marsham / work in an international investment bank in NY (page 53)

Zaire

  • Muzahim / Philip / counterfeiting (page 59)


Index of names, company names and properties


Notes & References

  1. Githongo's courageous whistleblowing actions have been the subject of much international media attention. See, for instance, John Githongo's page on this wiki, and a profile in the New Statesman from February 2006, available at http://www.newstatesman.com/200602060018.
  2. See, for instance, 'State Changes Tune on Looted Billions Abroad', http://www.globalpolicy.org/nations/launder/regions/2005/0519tune.htm, May 19, 2005, written as the investigation was wound down by the Kenyan government. Kroll also played a role in the investigations of the Anglo Leasing investigations, see e.g.'Githongo secret diary', http://allafrica.com/stories/200601240569.html.
  3. See http://www.warmafrica.com/index/geo/9/cat/1/a/a/artid/135
  4. See, e.g., in Time Magazine's article on Githongo, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901060306-1167713-1,00.html: 'Githongo's crusade started at a time of great hope. In 2002, Mwai Kibaki, head of the National Rainbow Coalition, won the presidency, promising an end to corruption as "a way of life."'
  5. See, e.g., 'Kenya's anti-graft czar resigns', http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4243619.stm, and 'Kenya graft fighter 'threatened, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4249679.stm.
  6. 'Kenya: What Moi-Kibaki Alliance Means', http://allafrica.com/stories/200708281270.html.
  7. 'Kenya: Kibaki Appoints Moi Peace Envoy', http://allafrica.com/stories/200707250755.html.
  8. The table of contents is not easy to follow and does not make this clear, but there are 'sectioning' pages. It is a 'consolidated report', perhaps consolidating smaller reports. There are duplicate sections for some individuals investigated. The table of contents refers to an 'Introduction' section, which apparently has been redacted.
  9. see, e.g. http://www.motherjones.com/news/feature/1998/03/private_eye.html
  10. As documented by Githongo himself: see 'Githongo secret diary', http://allafrica.com/stories/200601240569.html.
  11. http://www.kroll.com/services/ifai/professionals/marshall/
  12. See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Goldenberg_scandal#Travel_restrictions and http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4711546.stm.
  13. See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gideon_Moi.
  14. See, e.g., http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nicholas_Biwott and http://allafrica.com/stories/200503020867.html.
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