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United Nations Mission in Liberia: Investigation into alleged theft of UN food rations by two senior officials of member state 1 aviation unit (ID Case No. 0504-05), 7 Feb 2005

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Release date
January 12, 2009

Summary

United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (UN OIOS) 7 Feb 2005 report titled "Investigation into alleged theft of UN food rations by two senior officials of member state 1 aviation unit [ID Case No. 0504-05]" relating to the United Nations Mission in Liberia. The report runs to 12 printed pages.

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Verified by Sunshine Press editorial board

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Further information

Context
International organization
United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
Authored on
February 7, 2005
File size in bytes
204987
File type information
PDF
Cryptographic identity
SHA256 462f8f65865e31544818fe210de07233b30315635c89945bf15dfa5b8f0c109a


Simple text version follows

            STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL


 This report is protected under the provisions of
ST/SGB/273, paragraph 18, of 7 September 1994




        UNITED NATIONS



     Office of Internal Oversight Services
            Investigations Division




                REDACTED
         REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

             ID CASE NO. 0504/05




              07 December 2005


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

   INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGED THEFT OF THE UNITED NATIONS FOOD
  RATIONS BY TWO SENIOR OFFICERS OF MEMBER STATE 1 AVIATION UNIT
                         IN UNMIL, LIBERIA.


                                     I.   INTRODUCTION

1.      On 10 October 2005, Senior Official of UNMIL requested the assistance of ID/OIOS in
an investigation of an alleged theft of UN-provided food rations by members of the Member
State 1 Aviation Unit (hereafter referred to as MS1AU). ID/OIOS Investigators determined that
this case was triggered by information received from a source requiring protection from
disclosure and hereafter referred to as CS 1016.

2.      Military Police Investigator informed ID/OIOS that on 14 September 2005, CS 1016
reported to UNMIL Military Police (hereafter referred to as MP) the theft of UNMIL food
rations and sale to a local vendor. CS 1016 alleged that there were two military contingents
involved in this activity. One of those contingents was the MS1AU; the second contingent will
be addressed in a separate report. CS 1016 agreed to co-operate with investigators and supply
them with information that would facilitate the arrest of individuals involved in the illegal UN
food ration sales.

4.      As a result of the information provided by CS 1016 the MP and UNMIL Security Special
Investigation Unit (hereafter referred to as SIU Security) formed a joint investigation team
(hereafter referred to as MP/SIU team) that was tasked with the investigation of those
allegations. On 7 October 2005, the MP/SIU team commenced covert surveillance of the food
delivered by Vendor. On 10 October 2005, the team received information from CS 1016 that
there was a planned theft and resale of UN food rations. CS 1016 identified the trucks that would
be targeted and they were immediately placed under surveillance. CS 1016 informed the team
that those three trucks were carrying food intended for the MS1AU and Member State 2
Battalion, which both were deployed in the vicinity of the Roberts International Airport
(hereafter referred to as RIA). After food deliveries at MS1AU and Member State 2 Battalion
were completed, the MP/SIU team stopped the Vendor truck and on inspection found food items
in this vehicle. The MP/SIU team detained Employee 1 (driver of the Vendor truck), Vendor
Employee 2 (Vendor truck assistant) and Local Vendor.

5.       After the initial interviews were completed the allegations centered on Military Officer 1
and Military Officer 2, both senior officers serving with the MS1AU. The two officers allegedly
created a scheme in which they managed to steal and then sell to local vendors UN-issued food
rations.


                               II.   BACKGROUND INFORMATION

6.      Between 1989 and 2003, the civil war in Liberia claimed the lives of almost 150,000
people, mostly civilians, and led to a complete breakdown of law and order. It displaced scores
of people, both internally and beyond the borders, resulting in some 850,000 becoming refugees
in the neighbouring countries. In August 2003, a comprehensive peace agreement ended 14 years
of civil war and prompted the resignation of former president Charles Taylor, who was exiled to
                                                1


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Nigeria. The United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was established by Security Council
resolution 1509 of 19 September 2003 in order to support the implementation of the ceasefire
agreement and the peace process. As of 30 September 2005, the strength of UNMIL is 15,974
uniformed personnel, including 14,674 troops and 207 military observers; 1,093 police supported
by 556 international civilian personnel, 826 local staff and 442 United Nations Volunteers.

7.      The Government of Member State 1, based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed
with DPKO on 20 September 2004 (hereafter referred to as MOU), contributes to the
peacekeeping operations of UNMIL with an Aviation Unit of 300 personnel, which is deployed
at the RIA in Monrovia.

                                    III.    APPLICABLE LAW

8.     Agreement between Liberia and the United Nations Concerning the Status of the UN
       Mission in Liberia (hereafter referred to as the SOFA) dated 06 November 2005:

       a) Paragraph 29 � Military personnel of national contingents assigned to military
       component of UNMIL shall have the privileges and immunities specifically provided for
       the present Agreement.

       b) Paragraph 51.b. � Military members of military component of UNMIL shall be
       subject to the executive jurisdiction of their respective participating states in respect of
       any criminal offences which may be committed by them in Liberia.

9.     Member State 1 Criminal Code:

       The Member State 1 Criminal Code provides for criminal sanctions for conduct such as
       here alleged.

       b) Paragraph 191 Misappropriation, embezzlement or conversion of property by
       malversation (through abuse of authority)

       Article 1. Misappropriation or embezzlement of somebody else's property by a person to
       whom it was entrusted, shall be punishable by a fine up to 50 tax-free minimum incomes,
       or correctional labour for a term up to two years, or restraint of liberty for a term up to
       four years, or imprisonment for a term up to four years, with or without the deprivation
       of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in certain activities for a term up to
       three years.

       Article 3. Any such actions as provided for by paragraph 1 or 2 of this Article, if repeated
       or committed by a group of persons upon their prior conspiracy, shall be punishable by
       restraint of liberty for a term of three to five years, or imprisonment for a term of three to
       eight years, with the deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or engage in
       certain activities for a term up to three years.



       c) Paragraph 364 Abuse of Authority or Office
                                                 2


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

       Article 1. Abuse of authority or office, that is a wilful use of authority or official position
       contrary to the official interests by an official for mercenary motives or other personal
       benefit or benefit of any third persons, where it caused any substantial damage to legally
       protected rights, freedoms and interests of individual citizens, or state and public
       interests, or interests of legal entities, shall be punishable by correctional labour for a
       term of up to two years, or arrest for a term up to six months or restraint of liberty for a
       term up to three years, with a deprivation of the right to occupy certain positions or
       engage in certain activities for a term up to three years.

10.    Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets in Peacekeeping Operations provides:

       6.      Properly care for and account for all United Nations money, vehicles, equipment
       and property assigned to you and do not trade or barter with them to seek personal
       benefits.

11.    Criminal Code of Liberia:

       The Liberian Criminal Code provides for criminal sanctions for conduct such as here
       alleged.

       Article 15.51 Theft of Property - A person is guilty of theft if he:

       (a) Knowingly takes, misappropriates, converts, or exercise unauthorised control over,
       or makes an unauthorised transfer of an interest in, the property of another with the
       purpose of depriving the owner thereof;

       (b) Knowingly obtains the property of another by deception or by threat with the
       purpose of depriving the owner thereof or purposely deprives another of his property by
       deception or by threat, or

       (c) Knowingly receives, retains or disposes of property of another which has been
       stolen, with the purpose of depriving the owner thereof.


                                        IV.    METHODOLOGY

12.     Between 19 October and 05 November 2005, ID/OIOS Investigators conducted an
investigation into the allegations as provided by Senior Official. These inquiries included, but
were not limited to, collection and analysis of all available information and documents,
interviews with national and international staff of UNMIL and the staff of Vendor, a contractor
that supplies food for UNMIL, and others with knowledge relevant to the case, including CS
1016. On 28 October 2005, ID/OIOS Investigators accompanied by Military Police, Security and
various UNMIL experts carried out an inspection at the MS1AU headquarters to collect
additional information. Subsequently, ID/OIOS Investigators interviewed Military Officers 1 and
2 in order to give them the opportunity to provide explanations with regard to the allegations and
to comment on the evidence.

                                                  3


-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 V.    INVESTIGATIVE DETAILS

A.     Inquiry into an alleged theft of UN food rations by MS1AU senior military personnel:

13.     ID/OIOS interviewed Military Police Investigator, who was in charge of the MP
investigators within the MP/SIU investigation team. Military Police Investigator stated that as
soon as he received information from CS 1016 about the planned theft of the UN food rations,
the MP/SIU team immediately placed under surveillance three Vendor trucks and at the same
time the MPs set up a checkpoint on the road leading from Monrovia to the RIA.

14.     Shortly after the transaction between the MS1AU military personnel and the local vendor
was completed, Vendor trucks moved to the Member State 2 Battalion camp to offload the food
rations for Member State 2 Battalion. At the Member State 2 Battalion camp, Local Vendor
arranged for the food he had purchased from MS1AU to be placed on Vendor truck 1. CS 1016
observed these activities and relayed the information to investigators. At approximately 11:00
hrs, the Vendor truck was stopped and searched by the MP personnel at the Checkpoint.
Although the vehicle should have been empty it was found to contain various food items to the
value of US$1,615.55. The MP photographed the contents of the truck and secured the vehicle.
They also detained Vendor Employee 1, Vendor Employee 2, and the Local Vendor.

15.     During the interviews with Vendor Employee 1, Vendor Employee 2, and Local Vendor,
it was established that Military Officers 1 and 2, two Member State 1 senior military officers,
were involved in theft of the UN food and its subsequent sale. Local Vendor admitted buying the
food from Military Officer 2 and paying him US$600. Military Officer 1 and Military Officer 2
were brought to the Member State 3 Military Police Headquarters in Monrovia (hereafter
referred to as MP HQ) for interview. Whilst Local Vendor and Vendor Employee 1 positively
identified Military Officers 1 and 2, both officers denied any involvement in the theft or sale of
UN food rations. During the interview, Military Officer 1 stated that he was in possession of
US$200, however during a search of his possessions, MP's discovered US$120 and US$230
hidden in his right shoe and US$43 in his wallet. Military Officer 1 explained this discrepancy
by saying that the money belonged to him, they did not come from the sale of the food to Local
Vendor and he had simply forgotten to declare it.

16.     Military Police Investigator further stated that whilst at MP HQ Military Officer 2 asked
Local Vendor to change his statement, promising him the return of US$600 that he had paid for
the food. Local Vendor refused and reported the offer to the MPs. In his statement Military
Officer 2 admitted that he had offered Local Vendor his money back, but did so in order to calm
the situation. All military personnel and Liberian nationals were released after their interviews
were completed.

17.    During an interview with ID/OIOS investigators, CS 1016 stated that he had personal
knowledge of the theft of the UN food rations and its re-sale to local vendors by MS1AU
personnel and provided ID/OIOS Investigators with details related to the following MS1AU
cases:

       i.    Sometime in August 2005 Local Vendor had purchased food from the MS1AU
       food officer. The Member State 1 food officer signed the Vendor Delivery Note

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       acknowledging receipt of the entire consignment, even though a significant portion of the
       consignment was sold to Local Vendor.

       ii.     Later in August 2005, a convoy of three Vendor trucks containing dry food,
       frozen food and fresh food arrived at the MS1AU base. Local Vendor together with
       Military Officer 2 of Member State 1 went through the food delivered to the MS1AU and
       selected the items that were available for Local Vendor to purchase. When the deal was
       done, Military Officer 2 approached the drivers and asked them to help Local Vendor to
       transport the food outside of the MS1AU camp. None of the drivers agreed to participate
       in this deal because they were afraid of losing their jobs. (NOTE: ID/OIOS learned from
       Vendor employee 3, Vendor transport manager, that since July 2005, he has dismissed
       several Vendor national staff for their participation in the re-sale of Vendor food rations).
       The MS1AU personnel then removed all the food from the trucks and placed it into the
       MS1AU food storage container. This deal was not completed only because Local Vendor
       did not have available transport for this food.

       iii.    In early September 2005, the food officer of Member State 1 sold food to a local
       vendor (name unknown), and two Vendor drivers received some food items as payment
       for their role in transporting the food from the MS1AU camp to the Local Vendor.

18.      On 10 October 2005, CS 1016 learned that a food ration sale was planned at the RIA and
telephoned the investigators to provide this information. CS 1016 advised the investigators that
Local Vendor and Military Officer 2 again selected certain food items on the Vendor trucks for
Local Vendor to purchase for the purpose of resale. The selected food items for Local Vendor
were left on the trucks, while the remaining food was moved to the MS1AU food storage
facilities. CS 1016 also advised that none of the food items scheduled to be delivered to the
Member State 2 Battalion were sold to Local Vendor, as all those food rations were offloaded at
the Member State 2 Battalion base. CS 1016 also stated that Local Vendor and the Vendor
drivers made arrangements so that all the food items bought from the MS1AU would be placed
onto a truck driven by Vendor Employee 1 of Vendor Truck 1. This arrangement was done after
Member State 2 Battalion personnel offloaded their food from the Vendor trucks. CS 1016
provided details of Vendor Truck 1 to the investigators for their action.

19.     ID/OIOS Investigators interviewed Vendor Employee 4, Vendor warehouse supervisor.
He indicated that on 14 September 2005 he learned about an alleged food theft related to one of
the UNMIL military contingents. He informed his own direct supervisor, Vendor Employee 3.
Vendor Employee 3 stated that since July 2005 when he took over the job as Vendor transport
manager he dismissed a number of Vendor drivers, because they were suspected of stealing and
selling Vendor food items on the local market. Vendor Employee 3 confirmed to the ID/OIOS
that in September 2005, he reported a case related to one of the UNMIL military contingents to
UNMIL and requested an investigation. As the result of his request, on 10 October 2005,
UNMIL MPs successfully uncovered the illegal sale of UN food by two Member State 1 military
officers and several Vendor staff.

20.      ID/OIOS Investigators interviewed Local Vendor, who stated that he is a student in
Monrovia and works as a vendor selling food to make a living and to support his family. He
stated that he met Military Officer 2 of the MS1AU at the RIA in June 2005 for the first time
when Local Vendor was searching for food to re-sell. Military Officer 2 gave Local Vendor his
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phone number so that they could be in contact if any food was available for sale. Sometime in
August 2005, Local Vendor made the first transaction with Military Officer 2. Local Vendor
called Military Officer 2 and they agreed that he would come to the MS1AU camp and purchase
the food from MS1AU. Local Vendor dealt only with Military Officer 2, since none of the other
Member State 1 military personnel that he saw at the MS1AU base spoke English. Military
Officer 2 would select the food items for Local Vendor who would then pay him for this food in
US Dollars. Local Vendor could not recall how much he paid for the food during this first large
transaction. He stated that he would call Military Officer 2 from time to time in order to see if the
MS1AU had food items for sale. Local Vendor recalled having telephone contact with Military
Officer 2 on 9 October 2005 when he learned that he would be able to buy some food from the
Vendor delivery planed for 10 October 2005.

21.     As agreed, on the morning of 10 October 2005, Local Vendor arrived at the MS1AU base
and Military Officer 2 escorted him inside the camp. When the Vendor trucks arrived, Military
Officer 2 selected the food that was available for the sale and Local Vendor agreed as to what he
would buy. Local Vendor was to pay Military Officer 2 US$700 for the selected food, but
Military Officer 2 gave him back US$100 and asked him to pay the drivers for arranging the
transport of the food out of the MS1AU camp. Local Vendor arranged with the Vendor drivers
that the food would be put onto Vendor Employee 1's truck. Shortly after they left the Member
State 2 Battalion, UNMIL MPs stopped the truck. It was searched and all those found on the
truck (Local Vendor, Vendor Employee 1 and Vendor Employee 2) were detained and escorted
to the MP HQ in Monrovia.

22.     Local Vendor admitted buying the food from Military Officer 2 on four occasions, with
two of those being large purchases. Local Vendor stated that he had never bought any food from
Member State 2 Battalion, and that all the food found by MPs on the truck originated from the
Member State 1 contingent. Local Vendor also confirmed to ID/OIOS that Military Officer 2,
while waiting at the MP HQ, tried to persuade him to withdraw his statement suggesting that he
should say that the MS1AU gave him the food for humanitarian reasons free of charge. Local
Vendor refused to co-operate with Military Officer 2 and reported this incident to the MPs. Local
Vendor added that he used his mobile telephone for contacts with Military Officer 2 and that he
did not know Military Officer 1. Local Vendor maintained that he did not know that the UN food
sales were illegal and stated that he did not want to get involved in any illegal activities again.

23.     ID/OIOS Investigators interviewed Vendor Employee 1, a Vendor truck driver. Vendor
Employee 1 confirmed that on 10 October 2005 he saw Local Vendor inside the MS1AU base
with Military Officer 2. Vendor Employee 1 enquired from Local Vendor as to what he was
doing there. Local Vendor told him that he came to buy food from the Member State 1 unit.
Vendor Employee 1 saw Local Vendor and Military Officer 2 going through the food in the three
trucks and Military Officer 2 was negotiating what to sell to Local Vendor. When the delivery
was completed, Vendor Employee 1 enquired from Military Officer 2 about the items that were
left behind on the truck. Military Officer 2 replied that Local Vendor had purchased the items.
Vendor Employee 1 left for his delivery to Member State 2 Battalion and a short while later
Local Vendor arrived on one of the Vendor delivery trucks. Local Vendor asked Vendor
Employee 1 to deliver his purchases somewhere along the route and that he would pay the
drivers $100 US dollars. Local Vendor gathered his food, which he had purchased from MS1AU
and placed it on Vendor Employee 1's truck.

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24.     ID/OIOS Investigators interviewed Vendor Employee 2, Vendor truck assistant. Vendor
Employee 2 confirmed that on 10 October 2005 he saw Local Vendor with Military Officer 2 at
the MS1AU camp. Military Officer 2 and Local Vendor were in the trucks discussing what food
items could be sold. Vendor Employee 2 learned from Local Vendor that he had received a call
from the Member State 1 unit that they would sell some food. Later on, Vendor Employee 2
learned from Local Vendor that he had given Military Officer 2 money for the food, but Vendor
Employee 2 did not see the actual handover of the money. Vendor Employee 2 stated that
Military Officer 2 asked him to help Local Vendor to drive the food items out of the MS1AU
camp, but Vendor Employee 2 informed Military Officer 2 that he was not the driver and
directed him towards Vendor Employee 1. Shortly after, Military Officer 2 asked Vendor
Employee 2 for the Vendor Delivery Notes. He went with them to one of the offices and brought
them back signed as if all the food was received. Subsequently, at the Member State 2 Battalion,
Vendor Employee 2 learned that Local Vendor gathered the purchased food items together and
placed it in the vehicle driven by Vendor Employee 1. Both Vendor Employee 2 and Vendor
Employee 1 confirmed that Local Vendor did not buy any food from the Member State 2
Battalion.

25.     ID/OIOS Investigators interviewed Officer of the UNMIL Receiving & Inspection Unit
(hereafter referred to as the R&I) and Staff Member , R&I inspector. Officer explained that the
food is inspected at the Vendor warehouse in Monrovia and sealed by the R&I inspectors. It
becomes the property of the UN only after delivery to the contingents and when the contingent
food officer signs the Vendor Delivery Note. Mr. Mason confirmed that on 08 October 2005, he
personally inspected and checked the food items for the MS1AU and sealed them on pallets. He
then signed three copies of the Vendor Delivery Notes, as required.

26.     ID/OIOS Investigators clarified the status of the food rations with Senior Legal Adviser,
UNMIL. He confirmed that the food became the property of the UN from the moment it was
delivered to the contingent and the contingent representative signed the Vendor Delivery Note.

27.     ID/OIOS and MP investigators interviewed the Commander of the MS1AU. Commander
stated that he left the MS1AU camp on 10 October 2005 at approximately 08:00 hrs, as he had to
attend an urgent matter and said that he only returned to the MS1AU base on 11 October 2005.
Commander indicated that he did not believe that his officers would get involved in any illegal
activities in Liberia and that since the food was on the Vendor truck, it was not found on the
premises of MS1AU. Further, in his view, as the MP did not stop the truck right after it left the
MS1AU, the food might not have been from the MS1AU but could have came from the other
contingents. He stated that he had no prior knowledge of the alleged food rations sales by
Military Officer 2 and Military Officer 1.

28.     ID/OIOS Investigators interviewed UNMIL SIU Investigator, who was in charge of the
undercover surveillance operation on 10 October 2005, who stated that the surveillance started at
approximately 06:50 hrs. Four teams comprising MP and SIU Security officers kept surveillance
on the three Vendor trucks from the time they departed the Vendor warehouse in Monrovia until
their arrival at MS1AU at the RIA. The surveillance teams positioned themselves in the area of
the RIA, so that they had unobstructed view of the area at all times. SIU Investigator was located
at the parking lot of a restaurant, approximately fifteen meters from the road. He had a clear view
of the road and saw the Vendor vehicles as well as other military vehicles coming and leaving
the MS1AU and the Member State 2 Battalion camps. He was telephoned by CS 1016 and
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informed of movement of Vendor truck 1 with the stolen food. SIU Investigator observed the
truck from the time it left the Member State 2 Battalion camp until the checkpoint where the
vehicle was stopped by MPs. He excluded the possibility that food would be offloaded and/or
loaded on this truck between the Member State 2 Battalion and the MP checkpoint.

29.     ID/OIOS and MP/UNMIL investigators interviewed Military Officer 2 who was given
the opportunity to answer to the allegation related to his involvement in the theft and sale of the
UN food rations to Local Vendor. Military Officer 2 stated that he did not know Local Vendor
and he did not sell any food to him or anybody else. During the interviews with MP and SIU
investigators, Military Officer 2 was questioned about the usage of his SIM card and he did not
mention in his statements that his SIM card was lost. When interviewed by ID/OIOS he claimed
that he had lost his SIM card on 08 October 2005, a day before Local Vendor called him to
organize the transaction. When confronted with the phone record of Local Vendor's mobile
telephone, which clearly shows calls between Military Officer 2 and Local Vendor telephones on
04 and 09 October 2005, Military Officer 2 answered: "It appears to be my number. I do not
know why Local Vendor would call me". Military Officer 2 concluded that Military Officer 1 was
responsible for the food rations in MS1AU and that he only translated for him, since Military
Officer 1 did not speak English.

30.     ID/OIOS and MP/UNMIL investigators interviewed Military Officer 1 of MS1AU.
During this interview he was also given an opportunity to answer to the allegation related to his
involvement in the theft and sale of the UN food rations to Local Vendor. Military Officer 1
stated that it was not allowed for anyone to sell UN food received for the sole consumption of the
military contingent and indicated that every month the MS1AU military personnel take part in
the briefings related to rules and procedures and that he personally received briefings from
MS1AU Commander and Deputy Commander in relation to the proper conduct and dealings
with the food rations. Military Officer 1 stated that he was personally responsible for the
receiving and inspection requirements of all the food rations for the MS1AU. Military Officer 1
explained that he signs Vendor Delivery Notes and that his signature confirms that the MS1AU
received the food declared in the Vendor Delivery Notes. He stated that on 10 October 2005 he
inspected the food delivered by three Vendor trucks to the MS1AU and that he personally signed
the Vendor Delivery Notes. He denied that he had stolen any of this food and sold it to Local
Vendor. In his statement to the MP, Military Officer 1 admitted knowing Local Vendor by sight,
as he had previously seen him in the MS1AU camp, but could not explain what in particular
Local Vendor was doing inside of the MS1AU camp. Military Officer 1 denied that he would
participate in any sales of UN food to local vendors. He stated that Military Officer 2 helped him
to deal with the Vendor staff since he spoke English.

B.     Inquiry into the telephone records

31.     ID/OIOS investigators obtained telephone records for Local Vendor and Military Officer
2 from the local providers to determine whether there were communications between both
parties. ID/OIOS Investigators reviewed these telephone records in order to establish the dates
when the two individuals were in telephone contact. Due to technical problems of the local
providers it was impossible to get all relevant records for the time period August � October 2005.

32.   The available record for Local Vendor's telephone number (time period 03 and 13
October 2005) indicates that Local Vendor had three connected telephone calls with Military
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Officer 2. Local Vendor telephoned Military Officer 2 twice on 04 October 2005 (at 09:51 � the
call was connected for 12 seconds; at 12:04 hrs � the call was connected for 27 seconds) and
once on 09 October 2005 at 17:47 hrs. The call on 09 October 2005 was connected for one and a
half minutes. Records for Military Officer 2's telephone number (time period 14 and 20 October
2005) show that the user repeatedly called numbers belonging to other Member State 1 military
officers, including the duty room. This clearly undermines the claim made by Military Officer 2,
that he lost his SIM card around 08 October 2005.

C.     Inquiry into the food entitlement for military personnel serving in UNMIL.

33.     ID/OIOS Investigators interviewed Staff Member 2, UNMIL Supply Assistant �Rations
Food Cell - in order to establish the volume of food rations allocated to military personnel
serving with UNMIL. Staff Member 2 explained that Food Cell deals with provision of food for
all military contingents in UNMIL and based on existing rules, which are prepared by the
DPKO, each member of the military contingent is entitled to receiving daily rations in a certain
financial sum. The contingents calculate the food entitlement for their unit by multiplying BOP
by the strength of the contingent and the time period of 28 days. The Food Cell ensures that the
unit does not exceed those financial limits, but has no influence on how much food is provided
by DPKO.

34.     UNMIL Senior Official, advised ID/OIOS that there are guidelines on the number of
calories per day in the allowance provided to military personnel serving in UNMIL. Senior
Official stated that the limit had previously been 6000 calories per day per person, but DPKO
had sought to reduce this limit to 4800 calories a day. However, Senior Official indicated that
any such reductions have to be reflected in the specific contracts and that the implementation of
such changes usually takes time. Therefore, UNMIL military personnel, based on the existing
contract with the Vendor, receive 6000 calories per day per person.

                                          VI.       FINDINGS

35.     It was established by the ID/OIOS that on 8 October 2005, Staff Member 1, UNMIL R&I
Inspector, checked the quantity and quality of the rations that were to be delivered to the
MS1AU. He sealed the items on pallets and signed Vendor Delivery Notes for this food. Local
Vendor admitted to ID/OIOS that on 9 October 2005, he used his mobile telephone to call
Military Officer 2 on his mobile telephone and they agreed to the sale of the UN food rations for
the following day, 10 October 2005. Local Vendor admitted that this telephone conversation
took place and his statement is also supported by Local Vendor's itemized telephone bill.

36.       On 10 October 2005, in the early morning hours, food rations were loaded onto three
Vendor trucks and driven to the MS1AU camp, which is located in the vicinity of the RIA.
Military Officer 2, together with Local Vendor, went through all the food rations on these three
Vendor trucks and Military Officer 2 identified the food available for sale. The items that were
agreed upon between Military Officer 2 and Local Vendor were left on the trucks and
subsequently transferred onto the Vendor truck (1) driven by Vendor Employee 1. Although the
rations were not collected according to the Vendor Delivery Notes, Military Officer 1 signed the
delivery notes and in doing so he took responsibility for the UN food being delivered in its
entirety. Military Officer 1 admitted received training and instruction from his Commander with
regards to the proper handling of food rations and admitted knowing that selling UN food rations
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is against the rules and is illegal. Local Vendor admitted to ID/OIOS that he paid Military
Officer 2 US$700 for this stolen food, which in fact is valued at US$1615.55. Military Officer 2
returned US$100 to Local Vendor as payment for the Vendor drivers who were assisting in this
illegal transaction.

37.     Having received information about the planned theft and re-sale of the UN food, UNMIL
MP and SIU Security placed undercover surveillance on the three Vendor trucks and closely
monitored the illegal sale. Having been tipped off by CS 1016 at approximately 11:00 hrs, MP
officers stopped Vendor truck 1 at the Checkpoint and discovered the stolen UN food. The MP
officers seized the truck with the food and detained Vendor Employee 1 (driver), Local Vendor
and Vendor Employee 2 (Vendor truck assistant). During the interview with MP, SIU and
subsequently ID/OIOS investigators, all three admitted their involvement in this theft. Local
Vendor also admitted previous purchases of the UN food rations from Military Officer 2.

38.     Local Vendor admitted that Military Officer 2, when both men were brought to the MP
HQ for interview, tried to persuade him to change his statement and instead claim that he
received the food from the MS1AU free of charge for humanitarian reasons. Local Vendor also
said that Military Officer 2 offered that he would return US$600, which Local Vendor had paid
for the UN food. Local Vendor reported this incident to the MPs.

                                        VII.    CONCLUSIONS

39.    This report does not rely only on testimony obtained from witnesses and the confidential
source CS 1016, but also on documentary evidence. Steps to validate the statements of CS 1016
have been undertaken and coupled with the fact that he reported these illegal activities and then
voluntarily participated in the undercover surveillance operation that led to the detention of those
involved, clearly demonstrate his credibility.

40.    It was established by ID/OIOS that circa August 2005, Military Officer 2 and Military
Officer 1 established a joined criminal endeavour with the aim to steal food rations provided to
the Member State 1 Aviation Unit by the United Nations. They engaged in this endeavour with
Local Vendor, a local Liberian businessman to assist them with the sale of the food on the local
market.

41.    On at least four separate occasions, Military Officer 2 and Military Officer 1
misappropriated UN-owned food that was for the sole use of the MS1AU. Military Officer 1 and
Military Officer 2 did so upon their prior conspiracy. These actions are in violation of Paragraph
191, Article 1, and 3 of the Member State 1 Criminal Code.

42.     Military Officer 2 and Military Officer 1 made "wilful use of authority and their official
position contrary to the official interests for mercenary motives or other personal benefit or
benefit of any third persons". These actions are in violation of Paragraph 364, Article 1 of the
Member State 1 Criminal Code (Abuse of Authority or Office).

43.    Military Officer 2 and Military Officer 1 violated the "Code of Conduct for Blue Helmets
in Peacekeeping Operations", by their failure to perform their official functions including to
properly care for all United Nations property assigned to them and upon their prior conspiracy,
sold UN-owned property for personal benefits.
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44.     Local Vendor, in the capacity as a food vendor, Vendor Employee 1 in the capacity of a
Vendor truck driver, and Vendor Employee 2 in the capacity of a Vendor truck assistant,
willingly participated in the activities that were illegal in their nature and were against the
interests of the United Nations. They knowingly received property of the UN, which had been
stolen and therefore their actions were in violation of Article 15.51. (c) Of the Liberian Criminal
Code � Theft of Property.

                                  VIII.     RECOMMENDATIONS

45.    ID/OIOS offers the following recommendations:

Recommendation 1: It is recommended that DPKO refer this case to the Government of Member
State 1 to ensure that appropriate action is considered against Military Officer 2 and Military
Officer 1 and the results of such action be reported back to DPKO for passage to ID/OIOS.
(ID Rec. IV05/504/01).

Recommendation 2: It is recommended that DPKO advise the Government of Member State 1
that based on the findings of the investigation, Military Officer 2 and Military Officer 1 will not
be accepted for assigned to any current or future UN peacekeeping mission and that DPKO will
consider whether to allow Member State 1 peacekeepers in UN missions. (ID Rec. IV05/504/02)

Recommendation 3: It is recommended that DPKO reviews the daily food ration allowance
provided to military personnel in UNMIL, and other peacekeeping missions, to ensure that
excess food rations are not supplied to military personnel that could lead to further theft and
illegal sales of UN supplied food rations. (ID Rec. IV05/504/03)

Recommendation 4: It is recommended that UNMIL advise the contractor, Vendor Support
Services Worldwide, of the evidence against Vendor Employee 1, and Vendor Employee 2 as
identified in this report, and that neither person should be involved in any United Nations
peacekeeping operation in the future. (ID Rec. IV05/504/04)

Recommendation 5: It is recommended that UNMIL advise all civilian and military staff as to
the proper procedures in relation to handling and protection of UN assets, in particular food
rations. (ID Rec. IV05/504/05)

Recommendations 6: It is recommended that DPKO consider the possibility of referring this
matter to the appropriate local authorities for criminal prosecution with respect to the identified
actions of Local Vendor, Vendor Employee 1, and Vendor Employee 2 in the theft of UN food.
(ID Rec. IV05/504/06).

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